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events intruding, notably the battle for Cuito Cunavale which raged during
the period of negotiations. This is also the most controversial aspect of his
interpretation of the constructive engagement era.
For many analysts the battle for Cuito Cunavale is pivotal to understanding
the Namibian independence settlement. They argue that the M.P.L.A. forces,
backed by Cuba, withstood a Unita/S.A.D.F. siege to hold this strategic town,
and that they then threatened to inflict a major defeat on the South Africans.
The ability of Cuban troops to operate in southern Angola, and the decisive
shift in air superiority towards the M.P.L.A., convinced the South African
military that continued control of southern Angola was impossible, and that
a negotiated settlement to Namibia's independence was imperative. For
Crocker, Cuito Cunavale was of no strategic importance to either Unita
and/or the S.A.D.F. Their objective was merely to prevent the Angolan and
Cuban forces from breaking out of the town. The S.A.D.F. was never
threatened with defeat, and the 'legend' of Cuito Cunavale was created by
Fidel Castro and sold to the gullible liberal press. Castro's lie was largely
uncontested because it allowed the Cubans the escape route they needed to
achieve 'peace without losers'.
This difference of interpretation reflects both the weakness and strength of
Crocker's book. It focuses on the diplomatic process from the personal
perspective of the Assistant Secretary of State, and minimises the importance
of other factors - local, regional, and international, as well as political,
economic, and military - which impinged upon, and were shaped by, the
strategy of constructive engagement. The strength of High Noon in Southern
Africa is that it assists us to understand these events by providing the definitive
insider's perspective on U.S. diplomacy and regional engagement.
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The conflict in the Western Sahara has now lasted for almost two decades, and
despite the presence of the Mission des Nations Unies pour le referendum au Sahara
occidental (known as Minurso) in the disputed territory, the U.N.-sponsored
referendum did not take place as expected in 1992. Unfortunately, the process
of decolonisation, for various reasons, is far from being completed and there is
little hope that the stalemate will be broken in the near future. It remains to
be seen whether, and under what conditions, the referendum will be held by
mid-1994, as recently urged by the U.N. Security Council.
Le Sahara occidental: enjeu maghrebin traces the origins and evolution of the
desert war between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacidn de Saguia
el-Hamray Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) within the regional and international
contexts, and reviews the roles played by those involved directly and indirectly
in the struggle. Given the claim made in the preface that 'despite his
Moroccan origin' Abdelkhaleq Berramdane has been able ' to transcend any
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feeling of belonging or of fallacious identity', and to provide an in-depth and
sober analysis (p. 6), one would have expected a 'neutral' yet authoritative
study. The well-informed reader will be quite disappointed.
In fact, one of the major problems faced by this French-based scholar has
been how to provide an objective account of the genesis and development of
the war given his clear attachment to Morocco's claims. In the introduction
he states tha t ' the Cherifian kingdom [Morocco] wants to find again its roots
and memory. It refuses to lose the Western Sahara when it has already lost
Mauritania, which it had claimed for many years' (p. 11). Throughout Part
I, 'Le Maghreb divise', the author betrays his sympathy for the Kingdom's
irredentist claims by his deliberate choice of language. For instance, he says
that, starting in 1974, Morocco sought an entente with Spain to recover its
southern territory. Elsewhere he argues that whereas Algeria strove to
encourage independence for the Western Sahara, ' Morocco and Mauritania
were defending their territorial integrity' (p. 52).
Unmistakably, Berramdane's main target in Algeria. One is led to believe
that the Western Sahara conflict was mainly created by President Houari
Boumedienne (1965—78) and, to a lesser extent, by Libya. From the author's
point of view, Algeria sought regional hegemony and also needed to expand.
Thus, by supporting Sahrawi independence, Algeria attempted to make
Western Sahara a ' reserve of minerals for its industry' and to gain access to
the Atlantic (p. 56), a thesis long held by Moroccan officials. Indeed, Algeria
appears as a Machiavellian 'super' power capable not only of outmanoeuvring
Moroccan diplomacy, but also of convincing the majority in the Organisation
of African Unity (O.A.U.), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the U.N.
General Assembly of its thesis on the Western Sahara. Although the Sahrawi
Arab Democratic Republic (S.A.D.R.) was consequently recognised by 75
countries, one-third of these are dismissed as 'micro-states' (p. 71, fn. 36).
According to Berramdane, Algeria's strategy was to keep the Sahrawi dossier
in the hands of the O.A.U. and to force Morocco to negotiate with Polisario.
Not only does he argue that the opinion rendered by the International Court
of Justice was ambiguous, but also that the admission of the S.A.D.R. to the
O.A.U. was illegal. Further, the author states, without providing any proof,
that Algeria encouraged Polisario in the 1970s to take French nationals in
Mauritania and Spanish fishermen off the Sahrawi coasts as hostages in order
to put pressure on both France and Spain.
Part 2, 'Les grandes puissances partagees', reveals few if any new insights
into the role of the outside powers. There is an excellent analysis of the often
contradictory policies pursued by Spain and France in the Maghreb designed
to keep their presence and preserve their vital interests. The strategic concerns
of the United States are discussed extensively, but the regionalist versus
globalist views within successive Administrations deserved more analysis.
Furthermore, the recent active role played by the American Congress, which
has favoured a rapid and just resolution of the conflict, has been totally
overlooked. Nor is there any mention of the now well-established fact that the
United States put pressure on Spain to cede Western Sahara to King Hassan
II, thus leading to the November 1975 tripartite accords between Spain,
Morocco, and Mauritania.
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Although the author used U.S. Government sources extensively, no
references are made to any of the numerous and valuable academic studies on
either U.S. foreign policy in general or towards the Western Sahara in
particular. The same observation applies to the chapter on ' La circonspection
de PUnion sovietique'. Despite having stated earlier that Algeria had turned
to the Eastern Bloc and that Morocco had renewed its allegiance to the West,
the author does not analyse Soviet-Algerian relations, and their relevance to
the conflict and to Soviet policy towards the Maghreb in general. There are
no references to academic studies on the subject either.
Part 3 , ' Le Maroc engage', though very informative, is really an elaboration
of Berramdane's earlier book, Le Maroc et VOccident (Paris, Karthala, 1987),
being limited to a discussion of those actions taken in the Middle East and
Africa to further the Kingdom's interest and those of the West, whose support
on the Western Sahara is badly needed. What is particularly curious, to say
the least, is that the Sahrawis themselves are totally ignored: no space has been
devoted to the tactics of their leadership or the merits of their cause, let alone
their long-standing suffering. If the author's aim has been to perpetuate the
idea that the Western Sahara issue is merely a conflict between Algeria and
Morocco, it should be noted that this was publicly refuted by King Hassan
himself in July 1987.
Le Sahara occidental: enjeu maghre'bin holds Algeria responsible for having
helped 'to create suddenly a people out of the sands', who having been
strongly armed and supported on the international scene cannot now be
abandoned (p. 100). Indeed, in the book's short and disappointing 'Con-
clusion generale' it is claimed that Algeria has 'mobilised its entire people
against another people, unanimous in its claims to defend the rights of a third
people that it was first necessary to dig up from the sands' (p. 342) — a
statement that sums up the author's unspoken political stance. It is unfortunate
that a wealth of researched material has been used in such a way as to support
his own and Morocco's position. And, even if he seems to regret the delay in
the holding of a referendum on self-determination on the very last page
(p. 345), Berramdane is silent about the reasons which have caused such a
stalemate and impeded the peaceful and definitive resolution of this long-
lasting conflict.
YAHIA H. ZOUBIR
American Graduate School of Business, La Tour-de-Peilz, Switzerland
Uneasy Friendship: Nigerian—American relations by GEORGE
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Collective, Oxford. Pp. xv + 244. £10.00/$ 18.00 paperback.
Nigeria's current economic recession and political turbulence notwithstand-
ing, the study of its foreign policy continues to be well served in quantity and
quality of output. Apart from the seminal volume edited by Gabriel O.
Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy-
Making and Implementation in Nigeria, ig/60-iggo (Lagos, N i l A Press, 1990),
there are lesser known works like U.Joy Ogwu and Adebayo Olukoshi (eds.),
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